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CONTENTS
• The IMF must change its sanction and incentive systems so that the next crisis is more likely to be prevented. It
should concentrate more on ex ante prevention, which can be done by clearly specifying the rules that will be
applied ex post. It should also rely more on automatic mechanisms that operate through the market in order to
get to the roots of a potential crisis.
• Ex post, i.e., when a currency crisis has already occurred, the IMF can only play a limited role in mitigating the
crisis. The IMF cannot play the same role for sovereign creditors as national institutions do in the case of
illiquidity of domestic banks and firms. It cannot take over the role of a bankruptcy court judge.
The IMF cannot credibly play the role of a lender of last resort. First, the lender of last resort lends to financial
institutions, while the IMF lends to national governments when they run into trouble. Second, the national lender
of last resort can print money and can thus credibly stop a crisis. For the IMF, this is not possible. Therefore,
the central banks will have to play the role of a lender of last resort in a coordinated action if a systemic crisis
for the world economy develops. The IMF is involved only initially, somewhat easing the task of the true lender
of last resort, the central banks.
• Ex post, the crisis has to be mitigated in such a way that dealing with the crisis does not generate processes
and behavior that give rise to the next currency crisis. The IMF should avoid setting wrong incentives.
-The IMF should not make up for national political mistakes and national institutional deficiencies.
-The IMF should change its policy and not implicitly defend a pegged exchange rate.
-The IMF should stop lending to countries that are in arrears to private creditors and bondholders (sovereign
arrears) and should return to its previous policy.
-The IMF should rule out credits to sovereign debtors if the government of a country takes over guarantees for
nonperforming private loans, thus socializing private default risks.
-The IMF should think about scaling down its level of operations. This recommendation is in stark contrast to
the somewhat expansionist doctrine now being propagated by the IMF.
• Ex ante, some new rules should be established. In analogy to the "polluter-pays principle" of environmental
economics, a "troublemaker-pays principle" should be used. This would hopefully internalize the social costs
caused by countries behaving in a manner that generates instability and adds to the risk of a systemic crisis.
- The IMF should improve its early warning system, create more transparency, and provide more information,
including high-frequency debt-monitoring systems. The international community should intensify discussions
on standards that countries would have to follow.
-The IMF should specify the sanctions to be levied when standards are not respected. A penalty rate should
be charged if additional credit is provided. Requiring collateral would also be a strong incentive to sovereign
borrowers to build up assets.
- The IMF should define the policy it would pursue in the case of a crisis more credibly. It should move away
from the discretionary decisions of its case-by-case approach (favored by US pragmatism) and bind itself by
rules (favored by the Europeans).
• One way to improve credibility of IMF policy would be to rely more on automatic mechanisms that internalize the
external effects of national instability behavior. Thus, the IMF should not be a silent supervisor who deliberates
behind closed doors. It is better to blow the whistle and apply the brakes before the train crashes.
Involving the private sector in the case of a crisis is an important means of internalizing the social costs of
instability. In contrast to the mostly used American-style bonds, British-style trustee deed bonds are more
appropriate to manage crises as they include sharing clauses and majority rules.
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1. The IMF has not prevented the Asian crisis,
it has not prevented the Brazilian crisis, not to
speak of the Russian crisis. What can be done
that the IMF will prevent the next crisis? Of
course, it is an illusion that we can rule out fi-
nancial crises in the future. Therefore, the ques-
tion must be more modest. What can be done to
mitigate the effects of a crisis once it breaks
out, and what can be done to make a crisis less
likely?
2. A first major issue is what type of crisis
should be the IMF's concern? In today's world,
the dominant problem is a systemic crisis, i.e., a
crisis that is about to spread from one country
to another and that is likely to affect the global
financial system as a whole or a large part of
it. This type of crisis should be the IMF's
primary concern. In contrast, it must be ques-
tioned whether a purely national economic poli-
cy problem, which is not systemic, should be of
concern to the IMF. Moreover, to shield a coun-
try in trouble against the negative long-term
impact of a crisis is not of primary interest in a
systemic crisis; the main task is to stop the sys-
temic crisis although this should be done with
minimum negative impact. Admittedly, it is dif-
ficult to distinguish a systemic from a nonsys-
temic crisis and to determine the extent to
which a crisis is threatening to spread to other
countries, that is, whether contagion is immi-
nent. The countries are closely linked today, but
it is simplistic to say that any threatening na-
tional default is already a systemic crisis.
Furthermore, the main concern to the IMF
should be a currency run and not just any finan-
cial crisis; other types of financial crises, such
as a stock market slump, should only be rele-
vant to the IMF in that they lead to a currency
run. Again, delineating a currency run from
other types of financial crises is difficult. More-
over, a precondition for IMF intervention is a
liquidity crisis, i.e., countries being illiquid. If a
country is not solvent and if an economic situ-
ation is not sustainable, the IMF should not pro-
vide credits anyhow. Apparently, it is difficult
to determine whether illiquidity or insolvency is
at the heart of the problem.
1
The IMF's dilemma stems from the very fact
that it is difficult to define a systemic crisis and
that the IMF, de facto, lends to governments in
trouble. In this more-down-to-earth role of
IMF's lending to troubled governments,
2 the
so-to-say "ideal" case is when financing is
needed because there is a temporary negative
external shock that will eventually go away, but
that is causing problems in the interim period.
In the days of Bretton Woods, this was the tra-
ditional balance of payments crisis that arose
from a widening trade deficit, due, for instance,
to temporarily unfavorable terms of trade. To-
day, it is a currency crisis triggered by a sudden
capital flow reversal, reflecting some funda-
mental disequilibrium in the economy, i.e., a
situation that is not sustainable. Unfortunately,
in the real world the external shock may prove
to be permanent instead of transitory so that
there was no reason for interim financing in the
first place. Even more unfortunately, the crisis
may very well be homemade, i.e., it may be the
result of a domestic institutional failure or of a
national policy failure. As a matter of fact, all
the financial crises of the nineties have domes-
tic causes with homemade failures or weak-
nesses becoming apparent under changing inter-
national conditions. Thus, the IMF is very close
to national policy failure. It should be careful
not to become a funding agency for countries in
self-made trouble, that is the troubled countries'
global bank.
3. A second major issue concerning the role
of the IMF is what has to be done ex post once
the currency crisis is there and what should be
It has been pointed out that the Diamond-Dybvig
(1983) bank run model, in which illiquidity turns into
insolvency as a result of the run and ensuing fire-
sales of bank assets, does not portray reality, and that
historically it has been insolvency that caused bank
runs (Folkerts-Landau and Garber 1999).
Compare Article 1 Section v of the Articles of Agree-
ment of the International Monetary Fund: 'To give
confidence to members ... providing them with the
opportunity to correct maladjustments in their bal-
ance of payments...."done ex ante to prevent a crisis. My proposition
is fourfold:
(i) Ex post, when the currency crisis is there,
the IMF can only play a limited role in
mitigating the crisis. The IMF cannot play
the same role for sovereign creditors as na-
tional institutions do in the case of illiquid-
ity of domestic banks and firms. It cannot
take over the role of a bankruptcy court
judge. It also cannot play the role of a lend-
er of last resort.
(ii) Ex post, the crisis has to be mitigated in
such a way that dealing with the crisis does
not generate processes and behavior that
give rise to the next currency crisis. The
IMF should avoid setting wrong incentives.
(iii) Ex ante, all possible steps should be taken
to prevent a national (not yet systemic)
crisis from arising so that it cannot feed a
systemic crisis. The IMF should revise its
rule system to internalize the social costs of
instability behavior of countries.
(iv) Automatic mechanisms rather than discre-
tionary decisions should play a more im-
portant role in allocating the risks of insta-
bility behavior of countries to the countries
that cause the risks.
I. Dealing with Global Systemic Risk
once It Is There — The Limits of
the Ex Post Approach
4. Once a systemic currency crisis has already
occurred, or if a currency crisis is about to
break out or if a currency run problem is about
to spread in a process of contagion, it would be
the role of the IMF in an idealized world to step
in and stop the currency run. However, this
simple statement is subject to many qualifica-
tions.
5. The IMF has only limited power to stop a
systemic crisis, and this is likely to remain so.
Using the analogy to national bank regulation
(which in some countries is the responsibility of
the central bank, in others of an independent in-
stitution), the IMF does not have similar powers
vis-a-vis its partners, the sovereign national
governments. Using the analogy to national
bankruptcy laws, the IMF does not have the
legal powers of a national bankruptcy court
judge (Sachs 1994, 1997; Minton-Beddoes
1995), who can impose a standstill and stop the
run of creditors on a firm's assets, impose a
solution for the creditors, and make sure that
sufficient incentives exist to provide working
capital. Projecting these national approaches to
the global level, a moratorium would have to be
declared, existing debt would have to be re-
structured, and working capital would have
to be made available.
3 Fresh working capital
would have priority over obligations to pre-
vious creditors. Such institutional mechanisms
do not exist internationally, and it is realistic to
assume that analogous institutional arrange-
ments of the same caliber will not be around for
quite some time.
The IMF has circumvented this institutional
void by implementing ex post conditionality.
This is an attempt to enforce restraints on a
country's government and thus to change its
economic policy. This approach raises the ques-
tion of what the basis of legitimacy is for the
IMF to be a disciplinarian or taskmaster of
national economic policy, for instance, when a
small team of country experts can specify im-
portant aspects of national politics, as was
done, for instance, in the program for Korea
(Feldstein 1998; Sachs 1997), where even the
false conditionality was imposed.
4 In defining
the role of the IMF, a line must be drawn some-
where, which prevents the IMF from becoming
the chief controller of national economic policy.
6. The IMF cannot credibly play the role of a
lender of last resort.
5 There are three major dif-
ferences between the IMF and the national
-
1 This would be different from the involuntary lending
arrangements following outright sovereign defaults of
developing countries in the 1980s; this approach has
been ineffective in attracting fresh money.
4 It now seems to be agreed in the literature that, for
instance in Korea, conditionality on fiscal policy and
on structural reforms was too tight. It is still being
debated whether conditionality on monetary policy to
keep the interest rate high in order to avoid further
devaluation of the won was justified (Ito 1999;
Radelet and Sachs 1999).
5 On lender of last resort, see Claassen (1985) and
Fischer (1999).lender of last resort besides the lack of institu-
tional system for bankruptcies of sovereign
states, including the lack of international pro-
cedures for a restructuring of the national fi-
nancial sector in the case of illiquidity. First,
the lender of last resort lends to financial insti-
tutions, while the IMF lends to national govern-
ments when they run into trouble or threaten to
default. Second, in the international context an
insurance mechanism between banks such as
national insurance schemes in the case of
bank failures does not exist. Third, the national
lender of last resort can print money and can
thus credibly stop a crisis. For the IMF, this is
not possible. On the contrary, the IMF has only
a limited amount of resources. The usable IMF
resources of about $113 billion (April 1999)
6
would be a trickle if an extended crisis devel-
oped, for instance, if Japan or Euroland needed
financial assistance or if a group of countries
that are more important than the past problem
countries became involved in a financial crisis.
7
In addition, weak currencies are not usable for
lending. Therefore, the IMF could even accen-
tuate a currency problem if it ran out of funds.
This would be a destabilizing function because
of "bets" of financial markets on IMF budget
constraints.
8
7. If a systemic crisis for the world economy
develops, the central banks will have to play the
role of a lender of last resort in a coordinated
action. The IMF should not have any function
that could affect the world's money supply. If it
had, it would interfere with the role of central
banks.
9 This would violate the assignment of
policy areas to institutions. In this assignment,
institutions are responsible for these policy
areas and policy targets for which policy instru-
ments have been assigned to them.
1
0
It seems that the IMF is only involved in the
pre-battle ground of the lender of last resort,
somewhat easing the task of the true lender of
last resort, the central banks. Borrowing an ex-
pression from chess, in the lender-of-last-resort
game the IMF is the pawn, the central bank is
the king.
8. In the main function of the IMF to stop a
run problem, intricate psychological aspects
have to be taken into account. It has been
claimed that the IMF's initial response to the
Asian crisis added to the uncertainty and ex-
acerbated the crisis (Radelet and Sachs 1999).
An important corollary of IMF success is that in
the case of a crisis or an imminent crisis the
IMF keeps things calm and does not give sig-
nals that something worse could eventually
happen.
1
1 The IMF should take care not to
make lenders more nervous and induce them to
move out more quickly. This means that the
IMF must not destabilize the economic situation
in a country by its own actions. This is especial-
ly relevant, since the IMF lacks the institutional
backing of a national bankruptcy court judge, a
national insurance scheme, or a national lender
of last resort.
" Net uncommitted usable resources: $77 billion;
balances available under the General Agreement to
Borrow and the New Arrangement to Borrow: $46
billion.
' To illustrate the relative volume of IMF resources,
world trade is at about $5 trillion per year, total
imports of developing countries are $1.8 trillion (IMF
1997), total external debt of low- and middle-income
countries is at $2.1 trillion (World Bank 1997), inter-
national claims by reporting banks outside the report-
ing region are at $1.1 trillion (BIS 1998), problematic
credits of the Japanese banking system in 1998 are
estimated to run as high as $0.6 trillion according to
press reports.
8 Compare with the destabilizing function of resource
buffer stocks.
9 There are good reasons why the institutional arrange-
ment for a lender of last resort by the central banks
cannot be put into writing and why there has to be
some constructive ambiguity. It has to be left open
whether and under what conditions central banks will
step in. If the conditions were specified ex ante and if
they became known, an uncontrollable moral hazard
problem would develop where market participants
and governments would play strategically against the
central banks.
1
0 Thus, the IMF should make sure that it does not lend
de facto to private financial institutions via national
governments.
1
1 This does not contradict the recommendation (see
below) that the IMF should provide information
before a crisis develops.II. Avoiding Wrong IMF Incentives
9. The IMF should be more aware of what can
be done to prevent a crisis from developing. A
currency crisis arises when market participants
lose confidence in a currency, i.e., in the money
of a country relative to other monies, and when
they move out of it. An economic situation and
the exchange rate are judged to be unsustain-
able; and what is not unsustainable is vulner-
able. The root of this evaluation is that a funda-
mental disequilibrium or an imbalance exists
that has to be corrected. Possible causes for this
are that
- the money supply has expanded excessively
so that there is an oversupply of the national
money and devaluation is unavoidable,
- financing a current account deficit for private
or government consumption has driven up
foreign debt, so that the intertemporal me-
chanics mandates some adjustment,
- financing long-term private investment by
short-term foreign capital eventually runs
into problems, especially if overcapacity and
external shocks make the investments more
risky.
In these and other cases, the currency crisis is
rooted in a policy failure, especially in a defi-
ciency of the institutional arrangements of the
economy such as the misuse of monetary policy
to finance public deficits, lacking independence
of the central bank, unsustainable exchange rate
binding, nonexistent rules to prevent public
deficits and the accumulation of public debt,
and insufficient strength of the financial sector
due to ineffective regulation that does not pre-
vent short-term financing of private long-term
investment.
10. Following the argument that crisis pre-
vention has to start with the prevention of root
causes of a crisis, a major line of attack must be
to correct the political failures and to improve
the deficient institutional setup. Countries have
to commit themselves to internationally accept-
ed standards. These norms relate to prudential
standards for banks and other financial insti-
tutions, to guidelines for monetary expansion
(linking it at least in some measure to the
growth of the production potential), and to
limits for public deficits and public debt.
11. By lending to national governments, with
most crises being homemade and being the
result of a national institutional or a policy
failure, the issue arises as to what extent the
IMF sets the wrong incentives, so that govern-
ments (and lenders) tend to rely on future IMF
help and become negligent in their own efforts
to prevent vulnerability. Since the IMF itself is
subject to political pressure, then there is the
risk of becoming an international correction
agency for national government failure.
This problem of wrong incentives, also dis-
cussed under the heading of moral hazard, is a
complex issue (Hayek 1973). Thus, wrong in-
centives and moral hazard do not necessarily
mean an explicit calculus to take advantage of
IMF support in the future in the form of op-
portunistic behavior. However, potential IMF
support may be in the back of the heads of eco-
nomic agents; more formally, with IMF support
a side condition of decision making changes,
thus influencing behavior more or less implicit-
ly. Countries or creditors may feel protected
against low probability-high damage risk in the
tails of the probability distribution. The impact
of institutional arrangements on incentives and
the real economy is difficult to prove, especial-
ly econometrically, because the effects show up
in a long-run process, very often with not too
much short-run movement in the data. In ad-
dition, there is the question what would have
happened under different institutional arrange-
ments ("Lucas critique", Lucas 1981).
1
2 Never-
theless, there is so doubt that institutions matter
and have an impact on economic behavior and
processes. Examples are the erosion in the
efficiency of central planning systems, as pre-
dicted by Hayek (1973), and the effect of labor
market rules and social security systems in
Europe on the demand for labor.
The IMF should not make up for national
political mistakes and national institutional de-
It can be argued that IMF intervention in Mexico has
prevented a larger rise in emerging market bond
spreads and has contributed to a remarkable reduction
in the spread from spring 1995 to December 1997
(see Mussa et al. 1999: Figure 3).ficiencies. If it did, and sometimes it does, it
would honor economic policy mistakes and it
would thus be likely to induce new ones in the
future, generating a perpetuum mobile in which
the causes for the next crisis are laid down. A
case in point is the IMF's role in Russia, where
the IMF failed to implement conditionality and
where it seems to be trying to iron out internal
problems without being able to change the
fundamental economic situation.
12. The IMF should change its policy and not
implicitly defend a pegged exchange rate
(Rubin 1999). It should be a specific rule that
the IMF does not intervene and defend a
pegged exchange rate when the money supply
has increased excessively and when the nominal
and the real rate have been drifting apart mark-
edly for some time (a year or more) while the




On the contrary, this should be a signal that the
IMF will not provide funds.
13. The IMF should stop lending to countries
that are in arrears to private creditors and bond-
holders (sovereign arrears) and return to its pre-
vious policy.
1
5 This change of policy, which
should be credibly announced, is a necessary
step in order to involve the private sector (see
below). This means that if a country cannot pay
its debt, the debt titles (bonds) and credits
should be devalued so that the private sector
takes the risks. Admittedly, a default means that
it will be much more difficult for a country to
find access to the international capital market
again. But this is a burden that the country has
to bear itself.
14. The IMF should rule out credits to sover-
eign debtors when the government of a country
1
3 In the extreme, a case can easily be constructed in
which a systemic risk develops because a crawling
peg is not sustainable. If then the IMF contributes to
defending the exchange rate, it will get into a situ-
ation in which it has to pay without limits. It is there-
fore apparent that conditions must be specified under
which the IMF will not intervene.
1
4 A more difficult question is to what extent this also
holds in the context of a currency board assuming
that the institutional arrangement is credible.
Even if there is no explicit lending areas, there is a
fungibility problem in that IMF loans set free finan-
cial resources of national governments which may
then be used to service sovereign debt.
takes over guarantees for nonperforming private
loans, thus socializing private default risks. A
minimum condition is that the government has
applied bankruptcy proceedings to the firms and
banks in trouble and that the proceedings satis-
fied international standards.
15. The new IMF facility, the Contingent
Credit Line, which is supposed to prevent con-
tagion spreading to member countries with solid
economic policy, raises new risks, one being that
the country applying for the credit line may
signal to the markets that a problem exists. More-
over, the IMF accentuates the problem if it with-
draws this facility once the country's policy de-
teriorates in the course of time. Then, this new
facility may turn out to aggravate a crisis. Fur-
thermore, the credit line may be seen as a guaran-
tee which may lead to less careful behavior
(Golder 1999). It seems that this new facility is
moving the IMF in the wrong direction. Care
must be taken that this facility is not used to im-
plicitly defend an overvalued exchange rate.
1
6
16. With respect to wrong incentives we must
raise the question what the optimal size of IMF
operations for individual countries is (Siebert
1998). It is obvious that with an increase in the
scale of operations, the risk of moral hazard will
rise: the larger the scale of operations, the weaker
the incentives for governments to prevent
problems in the future.
1
7 Moreover, the larger
the scale of operations and the bigger the role of
the IMF, the lower the losses that the private
lenders will have to take. If private lenders can
expect to be bailed out, they will not have a
strong incentive to be cautious in giving credits.
Thus, with a larger scale of operation the moral
hazard problem increases and there is a point
where the costs in terms of moral hazard and the
loss of taxpayers' money outweigh the benefit
from resolving the crisis. Apparently, there must
be some limit for the scale of operations.
1
6 A new short-term facility to counter speculative capi-
tal flows as discussed by Williamson (1996) and pro-
posed by Camdessus in 1994 (see Williamson 1996),
seems to be a misguided concept. Such an idea can
only be born in a mind frame of regulated exchange
rates and "equilibrium exchange rates," which is a
rather unrealistic concept.
1
7 For a somewhat different view, see Nunnenkamp
(1999).In the past, the IMF increased the level of its
operations considerably. In the sixties and the
seventies, credits (mostly given to the industri-
alized countries in Europe) amounted to rough-
ly S1 billion per case or less than 1.5 percent of
the GDP of the recipient country. In the early
eighties, the credit level reached $3.5 billion per
case or up to 8 percent of GDP. In the nineties,
the amount of credits (now as in the eighties to
the developing countries) was at $20 billion and
between 2 and 6 percent of GDP (Figure 1 and
Table 1 in the Appendix).
1
8 Not counting the
outliers such as Bangladesh, Egypt and Pakistan,
IMF credits seem to follow an exponential
curve. Taking into account the total credit pack-
age by other institutions, credits have reached
nearly 20 percent of GDP for Indonesia and 18
percent for Mexico (Table 2 in the appendix).
17. The IMF is subject to political pressure to
provide funds not only when there is a systemic
risk but also when there is a national problem.
Since any organization is interested in increas-
ing its level of operations, as public choice
theory suggests, the IMF may not be strong
enough to resist political pressure to expand its
activities. The IMF would then degenerate into
a credit machine for political reasons. More-
over, the size of operation of the IMF has come
under severe criticism. If there are no restraints
to the financial means of the IMF, it must be
feared that due to the processes of political




This criticism also applies to the newly pro-
posed facility of a trust fund (Lipton 1999) fi-
nanced by a large general increase in countries'
SDR allocations.
2
0 The purpose of such a facil-
ity would be to permit the IMF to give low con-
ditionality loans. Such a fund would easily be-
come the pray of countries interested in new
Figure 1 suggests that structural problems were at the
root of lending in the sixties and seventies, whereas
the eighties and the nineties may correspond to finan-
cial crises in credit cycles. On boom and bust cycles,
see Mussa et al. (1999).
1
9 For these reasons, Fischer's argument that the IMF
can take over the role of lender of last resort is not
convincing. The term "credit union" (Fischer 1999:
11) suggests too much.
Such a decision requires 85 percent of the votes.
avenues of financing or it might serve as a fund
for US policy and be a way to circumvent
Congress.
18. In any case, the IMF cannot keep up the
level of loans that it has given out in the nine-
ties for two reasons. First, markets get used to
the high level of financial support. Lower levels
of IMF loans may be expected to not credibly
improve the situation and thus are believed to
be ineffective. Second and more importantly, a
further increase in the level of loans clashes
with the IMF's financing constraint. Thus, an
increase in the level of credit support cannot be
projected into the future unless there is a quota
increase. If not, an expansion of credits is not
sustainable. This may prove to be yet another
moral hazard problem, one which affects IMF's
credibility and which is more basic than its ex-
plicit or implicit invitation to national govern-
ments to be lenient in their stability behavior or
its inducement to private lenders to be less risk-
prone in their lending behavior. All this, to-
gether with the incentive problem, are reasons
why the IMF should think about scaling down
its level of operations in the future.
19. This recommendation is in stark contrast
to the somewhat expansionist doctrine now
propagated by the IMF. Its managing director
pushes the argument of increasing the short-
term SDR allocation in order to have more fi-
nancial resources and to be able to step in in
extreme cases. The idea is to specify conditions
for a facility to solve a "short-run liquidity
crisis" by using SDR allocations. This would
take a restraint away from the IMF; it would
imply that the IMF can create money.
2
1 The
first deputy director, Stanley Fischer, writes
about the IMF's role as a lender of last resort
(Fischer 1999) and stresses Article XVIII of the
Articles of the Agreement, which specifies that,
with a majority of 85 percent of the votes, the
Fund can allocate SDRs "to meet the long-term
global need, as and when it arises, to supple-
ment existing reserve assets."
21 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (1999).Figure 1: IMF Credits
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aYear of approval or extension. — ''Refers to GNP. —
 cRefers to the GDP of 1996.
1990 1995 2000
Source: For credits, see IMF, Annual Report (various issues), and IMF, International Financial Statistics, CD-ROM 1999;
for GDP, see World Bank, World Development Indicators, CD-ROM 1998. See also Table 1 in the appendix.
III. Internalizing the Social Costs of
National Instability Behavior by
Using Ex Ante IMF Rules
20. So far, the IMF has relied on ex post con-
ditionality to influence the stability policy of
countries as of the moment support was given.
Ex ante conditionality has been more or less
neglected. An important result of the current
discussion about the deficient incentive system
induced by the role of the IMF and the moral
hazard behavior generated by it is that more ex
ante conditionality should be imposed by the
IMF. In any case, taking over an ex post role
has an ex ante impact in that it forms expec-
tations and influences creditor and debtor be-
havior.
21. Countries that diverge from stability
pose a risk to the international financial sys-
tem. Consequently, they should bear the bur-
den of their behavior and should bear the costs
of their unsound economic policy and of
the externalities of instability they cause other
countries as well as the international commu-
nity. In analogy to the "polluter-pays principle"
of environmental economics, a "troublemaker-
pays principle" should be a line of orientation.
Such an approach attempts to internalize the
social costs caused by countries behaving in a
manner that generates instability and adds to
the risk of a systemic crisis. The obligation to
provide stability is assigned to the individual
country. It should make sure that stability pre-
vails at home and that the economic situation is
sustainable.
2
2 The alternative would be the
"victim-pays principle," which implies that the
international community has to compensate the
potential troublemaker for not causing trouble.
22 A more positive approach is to reinforce the self-
interest of countries and of political groups in coun-
tries to support stability. Compare also the WTO
approach to generating cooperative behavior of na-
tional governments by using supporting mechanisms
such as the most-favored-nation principle and the
single-undertaking principle. One would have to
look for analogous reinforcement mechanisms in the
world's financial architecture.10
22. There are several institutional approaches
to internalizing the externalities of instability:
2
3
- The IMF should improve its early warning
system, create more transparency, and pro-
vide more information (Mussa 1997), includ-
ing high-frequency debt-monitoring systems
(Transparency Report of the IMF). Informa-
tion should include the vulnerability in the
balance sheets of firms, banks, and govern-
ment with respect to foreign debt and long-
term debt. High risk weights should be put on
countries with a poorly regulated banking
sector. This approach means providing more
and better information to the markets and
then relying on the fact that markets will re-
quire higher risk premia from countries with
poorer economic performance. By strength-
ening transparency and surveillance before a
crisis can fully develop, there is less need for
large-scale operations. Secondary markets
will develop.
- The international community should intensify
discussions on standards that countries would
have to follow. These standards should be
clearly defined. Whether they are adhered to
or whether they are violated should be ob-
served not necessarily by the IMF, but by
other institutions such as the Bank for Inter-
national Settlements in Basle and by the
Financial Stability Forum.
- The IMF should specify the sanctions to be
levied when standards are not respected. For
instance, if standards relating to the banking
system are ignored, countries should not have
access to IMF loans (Calomiris 1998;
Calomiris and Meltzer 1998). This can mean
that an individual country would go without
IMF support. The alternative is that nonquali-
fying countries would have to pay a higher
interest rate on the IMF loans.
- A penalty rate should be charged if additional
credit is provided (Meltzer 1998). A penalty
rate, which should be preannounced together
with the modalities of the early warning sys-
tem when IMF credits have not yet been pro-
vided, would be an important signal to mar-
kets. The costs of unsound economic policy
should not jump upward in a discontinuous
way (or to infinity) when the economic situ-
ation worsens. Applying a sliding scale of the
costs for IMF credits in terms of higher inter-
est rates, the country would have an incentive
to avoid getting into a situation of illiquidity.
A penalty rate could partly reduce the bor-
rower moral hazard problem.
- Requiring collateral would be a strong incen-
tive to sovereign borrowers to build up assets,
including currency reserves, and not to run
them down. Requiring collateral would serve
as an incentive to private lenders to find ap-
propriate forms in which assets can serve as
collateral.
23. The IMF should be more conscious of the
incentive and moral hazard aspects of its support
policy. It should define more credibly its line of
operation in the case of a crisis. It should move
away from the discretionary decisions of its
case-by-case approach favored by US pragma-
tism and bind itself by rules (favored by the
Europeans).
2
4 Preannouncing ex post rules and
sanctions serving to deal with a crisis would re-
duce systemic risk ex ante. This would also pro-
tect the IMF against implicit or explicit political
influence, including the criticismthat IMF lend-
ing is dominated by US foreign policy interests.
IV. Internalizing the Social Costs of
National Instability Behavior by
Using Automatic Market Mecha-
nisms
24. A major question is, of course, whether such
new sanctions would be credible and whether
the IMF could stick to them in the end if politi-
cal pressure is strong. Thus, it may be argued
that tough standards and stricter sanctions may
widen the gap between the developed and the
developing countries and that therefore the stan-
dards would not be acceptable and also not im-
plemented. And it may be argued that a systemic
2
3 For a survey of proposals, see Eichengreen (1999b);
see also Siebert (1999a, 1999b).
Since financial crises will be different with respect
to size, structure and cause, only broad rules can be
developed.11
crisis may develop nevertheless and that if it is
actually threatening or if the argument of an im-
minent systemic crisis is used, the IMF may
prove to be too weak to resist political pressure.
In these cases, standards may not be credible.
25. If the credibility of IMF rules is uncertain,
one way to improve credibility is to rely more
on automatic mechanisms that internalize the
external effects of national instability behavior.
This means using (and designing) market mech-
anisms that can partially fill the institutional
void caused by the lack of an international rule
system for bank supervision and for the bank-
ruptcy of sovereign borrowers. The task is to let
markets
2
5 be instrumental in finding an inter-
temporal fix point that can stop bubbles from
starting and expanding and in defining the pen-
alty in form of higher risk premia. This means
that also for this reason the early warning sys-
tem should be improved. The IMF should make
it known when standards are not adhered to so
that the country would have to bear the burden.
As long as we do not have an international insti-
tutional setup in which the IMF can act as a
bank regulator and bankruptcy court judge anal-
ogous to a national setting, ex ante mechanisms
will have to be relied on all the more in order to
avoid defaults.
26. The IMF should not be a silent supervisor
who deliberates behind closed doors with the
country where a problem is developing, as this
involves the risk that not enough will be done to
prevent the crisis (Siebert 1998). It is better to
blow the whistle and step on the brakes before
the train crashes. It is better to allow a small
crisis if, in this way, you can prevent a large
one 26,27 Changing the role of the IMF in this
2
5 The problem remains that markets can overshoot due
to expectations. In the long run, expectations that
move away from the fundamentals will be corrected
in the market process as soon as the fundamentals
become apparent. The solution is to make sure that
an intertemporal fix point of sustainability as an
anchor for expectations is established. This can be
done by generating enough information on long-run
sustainability as possible.
" Of course, signaling more actively to the markets
that a problem is developing is a very delicate task,
and the IMF should not unleash the hurricane or
reinforce it, but it also should not hold back infor-
mation, so that people are misdirected in their de-
cision making.
regard implies that internal procedures of IMF
decision making will have to be revised.
27. An important means of internalizing the
social costs of instability is to involve the pri-
vate sector in the case of a crisis.
2
8 "Bailing in"
the private sector requires an arrangement on
how to handle private credits when private debt-
ors and sovereign countries get into trouble.
2
9
For equity capital, private creditors are bailed in
automatically when stock prices fall. This holds
irrespective of whether equity ownership is
widely spread or concentrated on a few equity
holders. For bonds and bank credits, sharing
clauses, rules on collective representation, and
majorities required for the modifications of the
terms of credit represent an institutional mecha-
nism by which creditors could assume some of
the risks (IMF 1999; Eichengreen 1999a). These
rules would help to internalize the credit risks to
the creditors, inducing them to be more cautious
in giving credits. In contrast to the mostly used
American-style bonds, British-style trustee deed
bonds are more appropriate as they include such
provisions. These provisions would also be in-
strumental in reducing aggressive litigation by
dissident creditors.
3
0 The clauses should not re-
quire a discretionary decision of the IMF to
become active. Additionally, private creditors
should develop their own international insur-
ance schemes.
3
1 Note, however, that this type of
bonds and these arrangements mean that foreign
capital would become more costly for the debtor
countries because it would increase the risk for
creditors, so that they would be more cautious in
buying bonds and giving credits.
The role as a silent supervisor brings the IMF into an
untenable position: at first sight, it seems to immu-
nize the IMF against criticism, but at second sight, it
makes the IMF extremely vulnerable as an insti-
tution in the long run because secrecy undermines
credibility.
2° For a critical view, see Institute of International
Finance (1999).
2
9 Private debt and debt of a sovereign country are hard
to distinguish. If private debt threatens to cause
negative externalities, the government may be forced
to underwrite the private debt in order to prevent a
currency run.
3
u It is then required less to amend Article VIII, Section
2(b) in order to allow the IMF, by a discretionary
decision, to sanction a temporary stay on creditor
litigation.
3
1 See, for instance, Grubel (1979).12
28. A universal debt-rollover option with
penalty (UDROP) as proposed by Buiter and
Sibert (1999) for all foreign-currency denomi-
nated loans and credits would give the borrower
the option of extending maturing debt for a
period. In order to prevent opportunistic be-
havior on the part of the borrower, a penalty rate
would have to be paid if the option is chosen.
The rollover option could be stripped from the
loan and could be traded separately, thus indi-
cating the risk of that option. Since creditors
may not be inclined to agree to this type of op-
tion, because only rather risky borrowers would
like to have it (adverse selection) and because
then high penalty rates would be required,
UDROPs are likely not to be used extensively
on a voluntary basis. Consequently, mandatory
universal adoption is proposed. In the case of a
pure liquidity crisis, UDROPs would provide
breathing space and have a similar function as
deposit insurance schemes. However, they would
precipitate the crisis in giving borrowers the
additional time to continue the same old policy,
thus increasing the possible losses that creditors
have to take. Thus, UDROPs may make a crisis
more likely (Eichengreen 1999a).
29. In addition, institutional arrangements for
orderly workouts in the case of a financial crisis
are needed. One aspect is that satisfactory na-
tional bankruptcy procedures should exist to
deal with a national crisis. The IMF cannot sub-
stitute for an institutional void in problem coun-
tries that is caused by lacking bankruptcy laws.
National procedures are also necessary to make
sure that the government does not have to take
over private debt. Furthermore, national insur-
ance schemes for banks that can deal with the
insolvency of individual banks are necessary;
these schemes need to be designed as to prevent
moral hazard behavior.
3
2 The other aspect is
that mechanisms should exist that allow an or-
derly international workout. Here, some issues
can be solved by incorporating them into
the bond and credit contracts, such as sharing
clauses. But in addition, some quasi-bankruptcy
rules for sovereign debtors in analogy to chapter
11 should be developed. This is a difficult task,
but implicitly rules are used anyhow, for in-
stance, in the Paris and London clubs. In these
rules, some basic aspects should be specified as
to how illiquidity and insolvency of sovereign
creditors have to be handled.
3
3 The IMF should,
by credibly pre-announcing conditions for its in-
terventions, establish international rules analo-
gous to national bankruptcy rules for sovereign
countries that it expects to be respected if it is
supposed to intervene. In any case, it should
specify such rules for national bankruptcies as a
precondition for lending support in the case of a
crisis. The IMF could also help to bring about
the writing of standards into international bond
and credit contracts which have to be respected
by private lenders when a liquidity crisis
develops.
30. All these institutional incentives should
signal to lenders that they need to take credit
risks into account and should induce countries
to make sure that they are in a sustainable situ-
ation and that they are not vulnerable. This in-
cludes a solid economic policy, national insti-
tutional arrangements that support sustainability,
and sufficient economic strength that a country
can ride out a crisis. The country should have a
low-risk profile. Specific aspects are an effective
regulation of the financial sector that prevents
the vulnerability of the financial institutions, an
appropriate debt structure that avoids a too high
exposure to short-term debt, and a volume of
international reserves that ensures that specula-
tive attacks do not pay.
3
4
31. The IMF must change its sanction and in-
centive systems so that the next crisis is more
likely to be prevented. The IMF should concen-
trate more on ex ante prevention; this can be
done by clearly specifying the rules that will be
applied ex post. It should also rely more on
automatic mechanisms that operate through the
market in order to get to the roots of a potential
crisis.
3
2 Deposit insurance schemes should apply to small
holders only.
3
3 For instance, sovereign debtors should expect that
they will not be fully bailed out and that there will
be a cost for them if their default is to be prevented.
3
4 Precautionary credit lines for national government
financed by the private sector may be another in-
strument.13
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ments, Purchases under the
dollars; Source: World Bank
Statistics, CD-ROM (1999);
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dGDP refers to 1953. --
 eGDP refers to
IMF, International Financial
1962. — fRefers to GNP. —
Source: IMF, Annual Report (various issues).15
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